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This  paper  is  addressed  to  economists,  and  especially  to  exten-
sion  economists.  My objective is to consider how to address the topic
of inflation.  In no sense do I aspire to set forth the one correct analy-
sis or definitive interpretation.
Definition of Inflation
Inflation  is  an  abstraction  conveying  the  observation  that  prices
of  goods  and  services  show  a  pronounced  and  general tendency  to
rise.  Inflation is that and nothing more.
In  a moment I will admit that inflation is now taken to encompass
much  more  than  price  trends.  But first let me  warn  against  pitfalls
in the  definition. It would be easy to convert inflation into a positive
force.  To  be  sure,  the experience  of inflation  generates  certain  psy-
chological  attitudes  that  become  motivational.  But  the  statement
heard  often,  "The  price  of such  and  such  went up because  of infla-
tion,"  can  be  correct  only  in  the special  circumstance  of indexing,
as  of  union  wage  rates  or target prices  for grains and  cotton.  In  all
other  respects  to  say  that  a  price  rose "because  of inflation"  is  in-
dolent,  wrong,  and  even  deceptive.  The  price  of a commodity  goes
up or down  because  of specific  forces  brought to bear on that com-
modity.
Another  trap economists  fall into is to define inflation prejudicial-
ly  - that  is,  in  language  that  biases  analytical  interpretation.  A
favorite  phrase  is,  "Inflation  is  too  much  money  chasing  too  few
goods."  Surely  the  monetary  school  promoted  this  canard.  The
phrase  suggests  that  monetary  authorities  pull  the  strings  of  the
economic  universe  and do  so  badly.  This  vastly  overstates monetary
influences.
A  second  popular line about inflation  is that too many claims are
being made  on the economy.  In a sense that is correct.  One question
3is  why  the contemporary  economy,  running under-capacity,  cannot
or  does  not  meet  those  claims.  But  the  phrase  becomes  a  foil  for
berating  the claims  one  dislikes,  such  as those  of organized  labor, or
civil  servants,  or highly  paid  executives.  Seldom does one include his
own claims among those that inflate.
Cliches  that pass  for wisdom  may  be the worst of all obstacles to
economic education.
Citizens' Interpretation
Most  people,  I  believe,  wrap  around  the  single  word  "inflation"
the  whole  retinue  of  their  concerns  and  disappointments.  Preemi-
nent is lagging employment and productivity.  Alongside that are indi-
vidual frustrations as dollar incomes go up but living standards do not.
In  the  popular  view  inflation  represents  what  is  capsuled  in the
crude  coinage,  stagflation.  In  other  words,  in  the public  mind  infla-
tion  has  become  proxy  for  the  many  uncertainties  and  apprehen-
sions that bother people.
More than Economics
It  is  unfortunate,  I  believe,  that  U.S.  economists  stand  so  much
in the English tradition of economics,  which tends to be mechanistic.
The  economy  is  not  a  machine.  It  has  a  physical  resource  compo-
nent,  but it operates  through  the interplay  of warm blooded human
beings.  These  in  turn mix and confuse their logical thought processes
with  their emotional  drives.  There  is  something  disturbing  and  even
pathetic about the prevailing state of mind today.
Daniel  Yankelovich,  my favorite taker of the public pulse, observes
that  inflation  grips  the public  as "no  other issue has  ...  since World
War  II."  He  adds,  "The  closest  contenders  are the  cold war fears  of
the  early  1950s  and  perhaps  the  last  years  of  the  Vietnam  war."
Reminding  that  inflation  is  more  than  an  economic  phenomenon,
Yankelovich  warns  that it  "would be  a great mistake  to  address  the
problem of inflation in economic terms."
What  are  those  other terms?  Yankelovich  is not clear, but he may
concur  that  Americans  have  developed  a  "psychology  of  entitle-
ment." He believes  "the nation's expectations must be changed."
How Good a Tradition?
In  yet  another  sense  I  believe  economists'  analytical  equipment
to  be  inadequate.  U.S.  economic  theory  is  still  in  the  tradition  of
Marshall.  That  great  man  was  preoccupied  with  partial  equilibria.
Those  of  use  who  were  adult  during the  depression  of  the  1930s
remember  how  futilely  economists  of that  day,  relying  on  partial-
equilibrium  concepts,  tried  to  account  for  what  was  going  on.
4After  all,  did not  Say's  Law  mean that  production  and  consump-
tion  could  not  long  be  out  of  kilter?' After a few depression  years
when  even  some  economists  were  producing  nothing  and  consum-
ing  little, the positive answer  of John Maynard  Keynes  was listened
to.
During  the  post-World-War-II  expansion  Keynesianism  became  a
cult.  I  never  joined  it,  because  I  was  too  troubled  by  the  neglect
of  price  level  considerations,  and also  because  of my  countryman's
doubt about fine tuning  an economy  by  simple  fiscal and monetary
manipulation.
Most  prophets  eventually  are stoned,  and Keynes is no exception.
It is  now  popular to  chastise  his  memory,  as though  somehow  his
intellectual  legacy  is the cause  of our troubles.  It is just as wrong to
vilify  Keynes  now  as  it  was  to eulogize  him earlier.  Keynes  almost
certainly  would oppose  some  of the policies carried out in his name.
At this point I  confess  the only  dogma  I  allow  myself.  It is to re-
ject  all  slick,  single-theme  explanations  for  the  present  morass.  It
follows  that  I  am  even more  impatient with  nostrum  prescriptions.
The  atmosphere  invites sophistry  and  charlatanism  and we  see  a lot
of both. They must be avoided.
Production versus Consumption
In  the  last  two  issues  of its  Economic Report of the President,
the  Council  of  Economic  Advisers  rediscovered  the  economics  of
productivity.  It was high time!
Throughout  my  professional  career  the  U.S.  has  been  ambiva-
lently obsessed with the techniques of production and the economics
of consumption.  Enormous  expenditures  have  gone  into  the  train-
ing  of  people,  and  into  research  and  development.  The  object  is
high  technical  capacity  for production  - that is, to be able to con-
vert our abundant physical  resources into goods and services. On the
other hand, ever since the depression we have worried about purchas-
ing power,  about making sure  consumers  have the financial  capacity
to  draw  human and  physical resources  into the  production  process.
If  enough  buying  power  could  be  expressed,  we  have  said,  the
production side of the economy would respond.
Our  faith  is  now  being  strained.  Even  the  Council  of Economic
Advisers  has joined  the ranks of those who doubt that our economy
is  still  so  fluid that it  responds  quickly  to the demands  made  on it.
Worse,  many  fear  that  adding  to  consumptive  demand  only  lifts
prices higher and speeds inflation.
Resources,  Performance, and Institutions
I  am  something  of  an  institutionalist.  I  do not  believe  that eco-
nomic  forces  find  determinate  expression  irrespective  of  how  the
system  is  organized.  Surely  it is not necessary  to debate  this point.
5Most  economists  concede that  both the nature  of the resource  base
(human  and  physical)  and  the  form  of  economic  organization  are
involved in the economic  situation today.
Resource  economics  is  getting  a  new  play,  and  deservedly  so.
But  resources  are  looked  at  differently  now.  In  a  summary  word,
during the yeasty  pioneer  years  of our nationhood natural resources
were  available  for  the  taking.  No  reservation  price  could  be placed
on  them.  The economics  of natural resources  was  the economics  of
their  extraction  and delivery.  As  we  became more  clever in extract-
ing and  delivering,  we  enjoyed their  stable or even decreasing supply
price.  Scarcely  more  than  10  years  ago  I  could pump  gasoline  into
my car's tank at 24.9 cents a gallon, almost half of which was tax!
Developments  during the 1970s have shocked economists  and non-
economists  alike.  The  decade  promises  to  go  down  as  one  of the
most dramatic  in history.  Physical resources  began to become scarce,
and they  did  so through  two  changes in conditions of their availabil-
ity.  One,  their  extraction  and  delivery  became  more  difficult  and
costly, especially  in older supplying countries.
Secondly,  OPEC  has  taught  the world  how to apply  a reservation
price.  It did so on oil. Other countries have tried to do the same with
other  minerals.  Some  persons  say  we  should  apply the principle  to
wheat exports.
So  we  have  the  interesting  and  perplexing  scene  whereby  OPEC
offers  a price  shelter  to U.S.  oil  producers,  yet billions  of barrels of
U.S.  oil are taken from the ground at a cost of $3 a barrel. Of course,
the upper limit to extraction cost will occur when it takes a barrel of
oil power to get a barrel of crude.
Resources  divide into  physical  and  human.  The latter have  drawn
a new and non-gratifying  accusation,  namely,  that the Puritan  work
ethic  has  left  us.  Yankelovich  touches  on this.  He alleges  that pro-
ductivity  has  slipped  more  than  data show,  as published data do not
"take  into  account  such  factors  as  poor product  quality,  pilferage,
bad  service,  low morale,  not caring,  and the costs of layers on layers
of  managerial  and  supervisory  controls  ..  .. "  Low  motivation  is
revealed  by surveys  showing  that only  one fourth of Americans now
view  "their  work  as  a  prime  source  of  personal  fulfillment."  Not
long ago, half did so.
It  seems  to  me  that  events  of our day  are  forcing  economists  to
look  again  at  the  make-up  of  the  business  world.  Only  individual
prices  rise;  and  so  we  direct  attention  to  why  the  price  of  steel
rises,  and  bread,  and  physicians'  fees,  and  cost  of hammering  nails
into  a  new  house.  When  we  do  so  we  reconsider  once  again  the
time-honored  questions  of  the  competitive  structure  of  the  U.S.
economy.
It  helps  to  separate  the  part  of the economy  that "administers"
6pre-announced  prices  of goods  and  services  from  the  part  that  ar-
rives  at prices  by auction.  Among other differences, auctioned prices
are  capable  of two-way  movement,  whereas  administered  prices  sel-
dom  go  down,  as  even  so  conservative an economist as Arthur Burns
declares.  It is  hard to avoid  inflation  if  some prices  never  go  down!
Prices  of farm  commodities other than fluid milk and a few others
are  auction-set.  Farmers  like to  declare how they  are victimized.  In
some  inflationary  experiences  they  are  correct,  but  in  others  they
are  not,  as  I  will observe  later.  But it is noteworthy that farmers pay
administered prices and sell for auction-made  prices, as a rule.
The Mystique  of Money
When  I  first  studied  economics  (1931)  professors  praised  the
statesmanship  of  Senator  Carter  Glass  in  setting  up  the  Federal
Reserve  System.  Never  again  would  the  U.S.  economy  be  brought
to  a  halt  by  financial  crises  such  as  the  one  of  1907,  we  were  as-
sured.  Never  again  would  the  economy  be  squeezed  by  a shortage
of money,  and certainly not one manipulated by J. Pierpont Morgan.
The  object  of  the  system  was  to  make  sure  that  the  monetary
mechanism  would  not  frustrate  the  needs  of  business  and  thereby
stifle the economy.
During  what  is  known  as  the  Keynesian  era,  though  Keynes
would  likely  disavow  much  of it, the doctrine  was held that mone-
tary  authorities  could  somehow  wield  both  micro  and  macro  in-
fluences.  They  could  serve  businesses,  and  they  could at  the  same
time keep the economy  on a nearly  even keel.
So  it is  that  during  1979  we  have  seen the  Fed, in  an effort to
play  the  macro  role,  try  to reestablish  a  shortage  of  funds  to  the
business  world.  It  would  replicate  in  miniature  the  kind  of  crises
the system was set up to prevent.  To be sure, an interest rate scarcely
equal to the rate  of inflation  is not really  high.  Both  businesses and
citizens  ingeniously  devise  play  money  to  frustrate  monetary  au-
thorities.  They  use  private  credit  and  land  contract  sales  and  all
sorts  of accommodations  to substitute  for M1 and M2.  Nonetheless,
in  principle  the  Federal  Reserve  authorities  attempted  to create  an
artificial  shortage  of money that is an interesting throwback to tight
money periods of the 19th and early  20th centuries.
There  is  a  basic  inconsistency  in  the  Federal  Reserve  System's
being  charged  with both serving  the financial  needs of business  and
regulating  the  economy.  Often,  the  two  objectives  are  in  conflict.
Dire  consequences  could  follow  if  the  Fed  were  highly  effective
in  its  macro-stabilizing  efforts.  I  am  skeptical  as to  how  effective
the agency  actually  is.  I believe  I  am joined  in skepticism by Arthur
Bums, former chairman  of the Federal Reserve Board.
7Inflation, Futurity, and Fixed Assets
I  come now to  the most  entangling  part of my topic. Inflation of
course relates to price trend over time.  It says nothing about whether
individual prices are too high  or too low.
Manifestly,  inflation  takes  on  such  dramatic  meaning  because
various  prices  do  not  go  up  in  unison.  Certain  patterns  of  leads
and  lags  are  familiar.  Inflation  helps  debtors  at  the  expense  of
creditors.  It  hurts  all  persons  on  fixed  or  nearly  fixed  incomes
and  is  devastating  to  retired  persons  whose  annuities  are  not  in-
dexed.  It  induces  a  scramble  for  all  parties  to  try  to  keep  their
prices  or  incomes  at  least  in  line  with  trends,  and  differing  results
are visible and meaningful.
Organized  versus  unorganized  labor,  big  versus  small  businesses,
oligopolized  versus  non-oligopolized  businesses,  industries  such  as
steel  with  politically  derived  peril-point  import  protection  versus
those that are exposed naked: the list is  long.
The  various  leads  and  lags  amount  to redistribution  of  income.
Sometimes  it  redistributes  from  spending  for  consumption  into
private  or public investment.  Developing  countries have deliberately
used  fiscally-induced  inflation  to  generate  savings  from  the  wage-
earning  population  for  development  purposes.  They  can  do  so
because  wage  rates  are  sticky;  for a  time,  purchasing  power  can  be
sapped from wage workers.
On  occasion  our fiscal  policies  have  had  a similar  effect.  Indeed,
one  of  the  reasons  for  the  clamor  for  a balanced  federal  budget  is
taxpayers'  belief  that  they  are  being  taxed  surreptitiously  by  fis-
cally-induced  inflation.  In  my  judgment  they  are  essentially  mis-
taken; their protest is more strategic than sound.
Our  present  inflation  is  not  primarily  fiscally  induced.  Our
country  is  not  resorting  to  massive  borrowing  to  fund  any  huge
public  works  or even  welfare  programs.  Paradoxically,  if inflation  is
forcing  a  diversion  from  consumption  into  investment  it  is  doing
so via tax deductions, a sort of publicly sponsored private investment.
Much  more  obvious  nowadays  is  the  opposite  tendency:  many
people prefer to spend instead of invest.
The  heart  of the  relationship  beween inflation  and investment  is
that  all  investment  is  a  promise  to  return  not only the investment
dollars  but  a  bonus.  Implicitly,  the  promise  is  to  return  dollars  of
equal  purchasing  power.  Put  in  "real"  terms,  we  expect the  invest-
ment  to  be  genuinely  productive,  that  is,  to yield  more  goods  and
services  than  were  committed  in  the  investment.  If it were  not so,
investment would add nothing to gross productivity.
The  point  I  lead  to  is  trenchant:  unless  an  investment  is  pro-
ductive  in  a  "real"  sense,  it is implicitly inflationary.  This holds true
8irrespective  of whether  the  investment  is  public  or private.  If that
outcome is not realized  - if investment  is not that productive - we
end up paying off in cheaper dollars.
This is  exactly what has  been happening.  During our inflation,  in-
vestors  invest and then are paid off in dollars of reduced  buying pow-
er.  They  complain,  and they  say they  are discouraged  from further
investment.  In  one  sense  they  are correct; in another, they complain
too much.
The positive  side  is that inflation is a bonanza to investors because
assets  appreciate  in value.  Even  routine turnover of inventory yields
inflationary  profits.  The  result  is  a  big unearned  return.  And then,
taxation  of  capital  gains  at  less  than  personal  earned  income  adds
to asset value inflation.
On  the  other  hand,  inflation  hurts  businesses  as they are forced
to  pay  higher  prices  to  replace  equipment.  Moreover,  conventional
ways of calculating depreciation  allowances  add to the problem.
Much  is said about inadequacy  of the present  rate of investment.
Our  productivity  has  always  rested  on high investment,  has it not?
Therefore,  slowed  investment  dooms  us to reduced  output.  Such  is
the  allegation,  read  daily  in  the  business  press  and  heard  in  eco-
nomics classrooms.
Perhaps  investment  is  the  culprit,  and  perhaps  not.  To  be  sure,
rampant  inflation  invites  spending  in  the  here-and-now  instead  of
saving  for  an  uncertain  future,  as  I noted  above.  It  is  one  of  the
evils  of  inflation  and  is  damaging.  Equally  true, though,  is that this
is  a  rational  response,  and  all  supporters  of  laissez faire doctrine
should raise no question.
Critics  worried  about slowed  investment  point an  accusing  finger
at the federal government whose tax policy, it is said, is discouraging.
In view  of all the write-offs  it is hard to be convinced.  Furthermore,
according  to classical  economic theory,  not tax policy but perceived
opportunities are what entice  funds into investment.
If the  economy  is  in fact entering a stage of reduced  productivity,
investors  are  making rational judgments.  They should not be faulted.
No  one should  be surprised  when  the stock  market refuses to go off
on a tear.  The market  may be more accurate than  the pundits. And
if  slowed  output  be  our  destiny,  tax and fiscal gimmickry  will not
readily  set things right.
Another  angle  to  the  situation  is  worth  a  note.  Hyman  Minsky
says  that  as  physical  resources  become  scarcer  the  economy  must
adjust  to  less  use  of  heavy  capital  equipment  and toward  a  more
labor  intensive  productive  process.  This  is  a  powerful  idea;  and
without defending it further I ask that it not be disregarded.
9Almost  a separate  issue  is  the surge  of investment  in fixed  assets.
Distrusting  future  productivity,  investors  turn  from  stock  shares
with  their  intangible  claims  to  almost  anything  tangible  and  dur-
able.  Enthusiasm  extends  from antique dolls to good farmland.  Even
European  and  Japanese  investors  are  getting  into  the  U.S.  land-
buying  act.  Investment  in fixed  assets  such  as  land  has the piercing
macroeconomic  consequence  that it cannot  add  one iota to national
productivity.  It  amounts  only  to  a  transfer  payment,  a  change  of
ownership.  And  tax  policy  to  encourage  this kind of  "investment"
is not only futile, but actually fuels further inflation.
In summary,  I suppose I am impressed by the sensitive relationship
between  inflation  and  investment  yet  skeptical  about  much  that
passes  as conventional  wisdom  and enters policy.  I believe we should
be cautious in making judgments about this aspect of inflation.
Inflation and Agriculture
At  this  point  I  turn to the familiar  terms,  demand-pull  and  cost-
push  inflation.  They  help  explain  how  inflation  bears  on  agricul-
ture.  Demand-pull  inflation  bears  differently  than cost-push,  and the
administered  price  sector  of  agriculture  responds  differently  than
the  auction-priced  part.  As  a  rule,  demand-pull  inflation  is  likely
to  bring  a  quick  bubble  in  prices  of  auction-priced  farm  products.
It  will  have  a  much  less,  and  much  slower,  effect  on  administered
prices such as those of fluid milk.
During  a  cost-push  inflation,  prices  of  wheat,  corn,  and  cotton
may  be  slow to go  up, but prices  farmers  pay  for fuel  and  fertilizer
will  increase.  The resulting cost-price squeeze leads to calls for higher
support  or  target  prices  and,  often  for  credit  on  favorable  terms.
Inflation's  greater  impact  by  far  is  on  the  value  of  agriculture's
fixed  assets,  mainly  land.  During  the  1970s  the  price  of  farmland
has  moved  skyward.  Asset  appreciation  has  been  twice  net  farm
income  and  even  when  deflated,  capital  gains  have  equalled  (de-
flated)  farm  income.  Land  price  inflation  amounts  to  a redistribu-
tion  of  wealth  between  generations:  the  gain  to  the  older  genera-
tion becomes  a cost to the new (except  to the select  few heirs  who
pay little estate tax).
It  encourages  investment  in  land  purely  for speculative  purposes,
without regard  for maximizing  productivity,  and  on  balance  it has a
negative  effect  on  productivity.  It  lures  non-farmers  into  the farm-
land  market  and  if  continued  will  pry  landholding  apart  from  op-
eratorship.
Because  various  origins  of  inflation  bring  different  effects  on
various  parts  of  agriculture,  agriculture's  stake  in inflation  control
is  by  no  means  uniform.  Debt-ridden  young  farmers  subject  to  a
price-cost  squeeze  have  grounds  for complaint.  Their  grasping at the
American  Agriculture  Movement  is  logical  if probably  futile. On the
10other  hand,  Bruce  Gardner  was  dead right  when  he  observed  that
landholders'  greatest  risk  in  the  present  inflation  is  that  it  will  be
checked.
I  continue  to  believe,  though,  that farmers'  primary concern with
inflation  is in their role as citizens, not as a special interest group.
International Aspects
This  paper  is  essentially  oriented  to the U.S.  situation.  Nonethe-
less,  inflation  is not some  plague  that has selectively  been visited  on
the  errant United States. It envelops the industrial world. It is vicious
in  many  poor  countries.  Because  inflation rates  differ  among coun-
tries - West  Germany  is celebrated  for its good record  - a study of
comparative  experiences  and  policies  could  doubtless  be instructive.
And the international  monetary mechanism redistributes  inflationary
pressures in unfathomable  fashion.
A Summary Word
I  have  offered  a  number  of  ways  to  look  at  inflation,  each  of
which  I  believe  to  be  useful  and  relevant  but none itself sufficient
or  even  entirely  satisfactory.  I  conclude  with  a few  highly personal
judgments.
First,  I  believe  inflation  to  be  so much a part of our mind-set that
significant  correction  will  prove  excruciatingly  difficult.  Yankelo-
vich  is  still my  favorite  commentator.  U.S.  citizens  simply  refuse to
believe  that  there  is  anything  basically  wrong with our economy  -
nothing  that  some  omniscient  genius  cannot  correct  by turning the
right valve or pressing the proper button.
Second,  in my bones  I distrust  a corrective  policy  of forcing idle-
ness  of  plant  and  people.  I  see  red  when  I  read  financial  writers'
glee  that  the  economy  is  being pressed  into  a corrective  slowdown.
My reaction  is to wish that they themselves might be counted among
the victims; their counsel  might change.  The policy is appropriate to
an  overheated  economy  but  ours  today  is  sluggish,  not overactive.
The first flaw  in forced contraction  is  its ineffectualness;  the second
is its inhumanity; the third is the risk of civil strife.
Third,  projections  that the inflationary  rate will itself  "stabilize"
at  somewhere  around  8  or  10  percent,  and  need  only  be adjusted
to,  are  unsupportable.  We have no guidelines to tell us what lies ahead.
Inflation has  a way  of picking  up speed.  Yet it also  saps the buying
power  of  so  much  of the  population that it  could ignite economic
collapse.
My  fourth  comment  is  much  more  substantial  and  contains  my
deepest  worry.  It  ties  to  the  most  vulnerable  aspect  of  inflation,
namely,  its relation to investment.  All investment, whether  equity or
loan,  amounts  to a promise to  pay  in the  future. An incisive  feature
of a faltering economy is that those promises cannot be kept.
11There  are  two  routes to correction.  One is the catharsis of depres-
sion  wherein  the  promises  are  reneged  on; the other  is inflation  in
which  the  payoff  is  sustained  nominally  but  in  depreciated  terms.
What  worries  me  is  that  the  sum-total  of  promises  to  pay  is  so
astronomically  large.  It  is  large  within  the  economy,  a  perilous
plight. Our obligations abroad are mounting.
Few  economists  are  as  apprehensive  as  I  about  the  rising  debt
owed  oil  exporting  countries,  notably  Saudi  Arabia.  A  substantial
part  of  Treasury  bills  is  bought  by  Arabians.  For my  part,  I would
rather  let  the  exchange  value  of  the  dollar  depreciate  still  more
than incur great international debt.
Cartelized  prices of fossil  fuels,  led by OPEC's  oil,  surely  are one
of  the  powerful  ingredients  of  our  present  inflation,  and  they  ac-
count  for  our  growing  international  obligations.  Can  recent  trends
continue  without forcing  a confrontation  between  oil exporters and
major  importers?  But a confrontation  can  be  successful  only  if U.S.
consumers  are  willing  to  forego  imports,  at  least  temporarily.  Idle
threats  are  futile;  we  must be  willing to play the hard game. I doubt
we are prepared to do so.
Fifth,  I  have argued for years that the competitive structure of the
economy  is  drifting into  a form that fits few if any models, and that
the relationship  of government to business is slowly conforming.  For
lack  of  a  better  word  I  call  it syndicalism.  Major  industries  are  be-
coming  oligopolized  entities  that  gradually  acquire  distinctive  pat-
terns  of  business  practice.  Government  influences  those  patterns
through regulatory  commissions.  Currently, an attempt is being made
to  introduce  inflationary  restraints  into  industrial  codes.  I  suggest
that  new  thinking  about  the nature  of  competition  and  industrial
organization lies ahead for the more imaginative economists.
As  my sixth and  final point  I  offer a world  view that I have been
expressing  more  and  more  often.  Without  seeking  to  be  melodra-
matic,  it seems to me the United  States and the entire Western World
are  going through  a watershed  period.  Four or five centuries ago the
West's  scientific  and  cultural revolution,  accompanied  by territorial
expansion  and spurred  by technical  miracles,  exploded into material
comfort and emancipated  the human spirit.
It  was  a  grand  achievement.  A  denouement  may  be  upon  us.
Population  is  beginning  once  again  to  press  on  resources.  Land  is
scarce.  The  environment  is  under stress. Although no doomsday is in
prospect  a tapering  off of earlier progress is likely and it is traumatic
to a generation that self-promised  Utopia.
The  problems  of  accepting  and  accommodating  a  less  bountiful
outlook  without  revoking  our  cherished  concepts  of  participatory
democracy  and  distributional  justice  epitomize the indistinct  hopes
and fears with which we surround the word, inflation.
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